The events of the past two weeks continue to confirm the title “ceasefire” of our previous article. However, during these past two weeks, as Iran’s leadership refused to give the U.S. what it failed to obtain through war, the situation has become more complicated. Internal divisions within the U.S. have intensified, as have the erratic moves by the Trump administration, which has increasingly resorted to—albeit limited—strikes against Iran. This is a reflection of the growing dead ends the U.S. faces in its effort to find a “dignified exit” following the failure of its core objectives. We have also seen moves by Iran to broaden the scope of negotiations, as well as signs of divisions within its leadership.
The U.S. is «boiling» inside
The conflict that has been lurking for several years now within the U.S. imperialist bourgeoisie and its political leadership—over the paths and means to reverse their relative weakening vis-à-vis their enemies— has been compounded by the disastrous consequences of the U.S. attack on Iran. On the one hand, well-known figures and media outlets within and around the Republican Party (Graham, Bolton, FORBES magazine, etc.) are openly calling for an end to the talks and a resumption of military operations. Essentially, they argue that the impasse created by the U.S.’s adventurous attack on Iran can only be resolved through an even greater act of recklessness. However, given the “weapon” of the Strait of Hormuz that Iran holds in its hands, its well-known ability to strike U.S. bases in the region, the oil facilities of Arab regimes, as well as the Zionist entity, such a choice could lead to situations for which neither the U.S. nor anyone else is yet prepared.
On the other hand, given the deadlock, we had the House of Representatives’ resolution (passed with the votes of some Republicans) ordering the withdrawal of U.S. troops deployed in the Middle East as part of the war against Iran. Although this resolution has no practical effect (the U.S. president retains the right to veto it), it constitutes a political blow to the Trump administration and an expression of serious dissatisfaction with the results of this offensive to date. At the same time, the “coordinated” criticism from American foreign policy think tanks regarding the quagmire into which the Trump administration has led the U.S. continues, painting a bleak picture of America’s failure.
Limited-range strikes and new developments
Based on the foregoing, we believe that the repeated U.S. strikes on islands in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s coastal military installations—provocatively labeled “self-defense” (!), are linked to the Trump administration’s attempt to break the deadlock. And this is not happening, as has been reported, to alleviate the pressure Trump is facing from the so-called “hawks.” The White House administration believes that the constant stoking of tensions, along with threats and the extension of the naval blockade (which, however, seems to be having little effect), will ultimately bring to the negotiating table an agreement “better than the 2015 deal”—which Trump himself had called treacherous before withdrawing the U.S. from it. What we are ultimately seeing, however, is that the U.S. is experiencing a constant disappointment of its expectations.
Iran’s actions exacerbated the U.S.’s problems. It was not only—or primarily—the military response it mounted to every U.S. attack. After all, that capability was already well known. Above all, it was the fact that Iran’s leadership, for the first time in practice and not just in words, linked reaching an agreement with the U.S. to an end to the Zionist bombings in Lebanon. Regardless of the contradictions and conflicts that characterize the U.S.-Israel relationship, the Zionist invasion of Lebanon not only had U.S. approval but was also used by the U.S. as a bargaining chip at the negotiating table—even as the U.S. denied that Lebanon was part of the ceasefire, and thus part of the negotiations! Thus, Iran’s targeting of Israel—even through limited military action—brought the issue of Lebanon back to the negotiating table and broadened the scope and conditions for reaching an agreement. The Houthis’ announcement that, if Israel’s attacks on Lebanon continue, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea will be closed to ships in any way connected to Israel serves the same purpose!
Beyond that, although the Iranian leadership appears relatively united, it is no secret that President Pezeskian takes a different (more pragmatic, more balanced) approach than the religious-political leadership or the Revolutionary Guards. Even if the rumors about his resignation were part of U.S.-Israeli psychological warfare, his public statement on the need to broaden the regime’s power base—as a condition for its long-term survival—did not go unnoticed by anyone. This is a statement that, viewed from another perspective, attempts to provide a way out of the regime’s actual weaknesses and is therefore in favor of—rather than against—it, naturally seeking to benefit his own segment of the ruling class.
A Summary of the Future
The military operation—and, more broadly, the U.S. move to support Israel’s offensive in the “12-Day War”—was based on the circumstances they had created through their strikes against the Palestinian Resistance, Hezbollah, the bombings against Yemen, and, above all, the overthrow of Assad in Syria. It was a test whose imperfect and limited successes left open the possibility of a reversal. The Middle East seemed to lend itself both to a blow from behind against Russia—which was expending most of its strategic capital on the Ukrainian conflict—and to the geopolitical containment of an emerging China.
What followed—namely, the isolation of Venezuela and the mafia-style abduction of Maduro, coupled with his replacement by the more manageable Rodríguez—gave the Trump administration a new lease on life. The buildup of military forces around Iran, as well as the attempt to exploit the protests of the Iranian people, foreshadowed the impending attack. These developments were coupled with the assessment that the decapitation of Iran’s leadership—which the notorious Mossad “served up on a platter”—was considered the catalyst for the primary objective. What was that objective? It was no longer enough to weaken the regime and “eradicate” its influence in the region. The goal of regime change—theoretically proclaimed for the past 47 years—which, in fact, had been forging strategic ties with Russia and China over the last decade, seemed closer than ever. Thus, Russian imperialism would lose a strategic partner of great importance in the Middle East. Combined with developments in Syria and the South Caucasus (Armenia–Azerbaijan, the Zangezur Corridor), the Russia–Iran Eurasian corridor would be called into question, as would Russia’s access to the Indian Ocean. At the same time, as far as Beijing is concerned, Chinese imperialism would see the China-Iran corridor—a strategic segment of the BRI (Belt and Road Initiative)—called into question, if not nullified. This corridor serves two strategic objectives: a) penetration into the Middle East, Africa, and, of course, Europe; and b) reducing its heavy reliance on the Strait of Malacca for trade, which is controlled by countries aligned with the U.S., nations that are simultaneously promoting the U.S.-India IMEC as a competitor to the BRI. A secondary issue was the blow to China’s energy access to Middle Eastern oil. While it may source 50% of its oil needs from there, oil accounts for only 6% of its economy’s energy mix. Furthermore, its efforts toward domestic extraction and production, as well as its large strategic reserves, mitigate the impact of this dependence.
The regime held firm, quickly replaced its assassinated leadership, and demonstrated that it had prepared—drawing on the lessons of the “12-day war”—for a protracted conflict on all fronts. Politically, it had brought references to the nation to the forefront, relegating references to religion to the background. Militarily, it decentralized the structure of its defense and its responses. Aware of the vast gulf separating the two sides, it chose to rely on its ballistic missile program and asymmetric threats, and decided on the stages of escalation for its responses. However, these efforts would have remained incomplete, if not entirely futile, had Iran not received significant assistance from Russia and China, which made its attacks so effective, both militarily and politically. It transformed U.S. bases from a source of security for Arab regimes into a magnet for insecurity and danger. It shattered the myth of an invincible Israel. Above all, it directly challenged the United States’ ability to impose its will.
Given these facts and with many questions about exactly how events will unfold, we are certain of one thing. The “cornered beast” will not give up its global ambitions; it will not fade into history. Likewise, the other two members of the trio (Russia and China) will intensify their efforts to claim a more prominent role on the world stage. Their conflicts and the struggle for global dominance, as the history of the 20th century has shown, are resolved by force of arms. Only the peoples, through their struggle, can put an end to this bloody course.
Published in issue 1010 of the Proletarian Flag (June 27, 2026)